 Maritime
Security - A UK Overview
The threat of terrorist acts against the
shipping and port industry are real and not imaginary. It is for these reasons the Assembly of IMO, in November 2001, decided
that the Organization should review measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism, which threaten the security of passengers
and crew and the safety of ships. It is also obvious that the Contracting Governments to the 1974 Safety Of Life at Sea, SOLAS
Convention, when they adopted the special measures to enhance maritime security in December 2002, were well aware of potential
threats.Chapter XI-2
and the ISPS Code provide a methodology of addressing security threats and managing potential risks which ships and ports
involved in the international trade may face. IMO is of the view they are adequate to protect the shipping and the port industry
if implemented and enforced wisely and effectively in conjunction with the wider United Nations counter terrorism strategy.
Ships engaged on domestic voyages and ports which serve such ships need to be addressed by each Government individually -
and each Government needs to put in place appropriate security measures and procedures to this end, based on their own assessment
of the security threats.Security
threats change from day-to-day. Governments need to monitor changes and to offset them, as they occur, by communicating appropriate
information and guidance to ships and port facilities. Security is not a static issue and requires continuous awareness, vigilance
and prompt response.The
International Maritime Organisation has provided a methodology in addressing the matter by introducing a global minimum standard.
Individual Governments can use these as a basis for expansion as appropriate.The majority of expenditure to date has been on container security. Now however, some of the imbalance
is being redressed as it becomes more and more apparent that the threats come not only from the vessels that we know about
– those that are International Ship and Port Facility Security
– ISPS Code compliant for example (a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities, developed in response to the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United
States) – but from the many thousands of
craft that are not. Why? Because small boats are increasingly being used to attack shipping and maritime facilities, and are
the cheapest and most practical terrorist method for launching suicide missions and rocket assaults. This is why more and
more authorities are looking at tracking everything afloat, from the port or harbour area, outwards. Determining how best
to track, and thereby reduce the potential risks posed by the millions of small boats that regularly operate
in UK waters alone is proving to be a complex business. In the US, where maritime homeland security is taken seriously, and has already
moved up the security agenda, various initiatives are already underway, including the National Automatic Identification System,
Advanced Notice of Arrival process, and the International Maritime Organisation’s Long Range Identification and Tracking
system – LRIT. SOLAS V/19-1 LRIT regulations are the main immediate compliance concern, coming into
force at the end of this year, 2008, with phased compliance for various vessels of 300 gross registered tons and above, by
sea areas and build dates. The buzz phrase
today is ‘maritime domain awareness’ – or, put another way: knowing what is out there. In general, it has been the case that UK ports and marinas
have no need to know what is beyond the sea horizon, while closer inshore, within ports, harbours, marinas, rivers and canals,
there are currently no UK Homeland Security plans for the identification and tracking of small craft, vessels of under 300
grt, which cover the vast majority of leisure craft and canal boats.Ship and port facility security is a risk management activity. As with all risk management efforts,
the most effective course of action is to eliminate the source of the threat. Eliminating the source of the threat, which
in this case is those that would commit acts of terrorism or otherwise threaten the security of ships or of the port facilities,
is essentially a Government function. 100% security is an aim but cannot be guaranteed - hence the risk reduction approach
to lessen possibilities to the lowest practicable. In order to determine what security measures are appropriate, Governments
must assess the threat and evaluate the risk of a potential unlawful act. The ISPS Code provides a standardized, consistent
framework for managing risk and permitting the meaningful exchange and evaluation of information between Contracting Governments,
companies, port facilities, and ships. There are, however, no similar arrangements for UK rivers, canals and marinas, where
craft of all types can operate with near-impunity. Bearing in mind the perceived threat to the UK Homeland, and the unlicensed
availability of watercraft of all types, this is an accident waiting to happen. It has long been perceived that a real and
present threat comes in the form of a personal water craft, such as a small Rigid Inflatable Boat or Jet Ski, operating from
a large motor yacht, the nationality and ownership of which is difficult to ascertain. One can imagine a scenario, on the
London River, where a luxury yacht is moored off St Katherine’s Dock, just down river from Tower Bridge. All her papers
appear to be in order, and she has been cleared inwards by Immigration, HM Revenue & Customs. Meanwhile,
the River Police may have noted her presence, and given her a cursory visual inspection from their patrol boat. Five police
forces are involved in policing the River Thames with The Marine Support Unit of the Metropolitan Police (formerly known as
Thames Division), having the responsibility of policing the 40 miles of the River Thames between Dartford Creek and Hampton
Court. Today, the Marine Support Unit (MSU)
is part of an Operational Command Unit (OCU) called Specialist Support and is commanded by a Chief Inspector.
It has 89 police officers supported by 8 civilian staff and 8 specially qualified Special Constables. The fleet comprises
four Targa 31ft fast response boats, one Targa 37ft logistical support vessel and five rigid inflatable boats (for counter-terrorist
use). Three semi-displacement patrol boats are used for training, diving and other support uses. Eight Zodiac inflatable dinghies
provide cover for flooding contigencies and one Del Quay Dory is used for Dockland Security. The Fleet also has a command
vessel (the 'Patrick Colquhoun'). It operates out of its HQ at Wapping River Police station, about a mile
downstream from Tower Bridge. There are currently four reliefs (24 hour response teams) each with two sergeants and 12 constables.
They operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year with at least one boat actually patrolling the river at night. The MSU works
closely with the Port of London Authority, the London Coastguard, the RNLI, the London Fire Brigade and the Port Health Authority.
Together all these agencies comprise the Thames Counter-Terrorist Partnership. To be continued - by application to Maritime Tracking Systems : info@maritimetrackingsystems.org.uk
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